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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
VALGARDSON HOUSING SYSTEMS, 
INC. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
000O000 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 920644-CA 
Priority No. 15 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner, in this Petition for Rehearing, contends that the 
court granted the Utah State Tax Commission a greater amount of 
discretion than was intended by the Supreme Court or the 
legislature. The standard of review in this matter should be a 
"correction of error" standard rather than the standard used by the 
court which upholds the decision of the tax commission unless it is 
"unreasonable or arbitrary". 
Petitioner also claims that the distinction made by the State 
Tax Commission as to the differences between a real property 
transaction and a personal property transaction does not fit even 
the standard of reasonableness. Petitioner believes the Utah 
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Supreme Court has set forth the type of analysis that must be used 
in such cases; and that neither the Utah State Tax Commission nor 
this Court has used that standard. 
Assuming, but not admitting, that the Court was correct 
concerning the two points raised above, Petitioner contends that 
the Court has ordered the wrong transaction taxed. The transaction 
to be taxed should involve the sale by the contractor-dealer to the 
ultimate consumer; and this Petitioner should not be liable for any 
payment or collection of sales taxes. 
POINT I 
IN ITS RULING ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THIS COURT HAS 
GRANTED THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION GREATER DISCRETION 
THAN INTENDED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE 
LEGISLATURE. 
The Court, in its opinion in this matter, first stated that 
this Court would review agency decisions interpreting statutory law 
by a "correction of error standard" unless the legislature has 
expressly or impliedly granted the agency discretion to interpret 
and administer the statute at issue. The Court then found the 
implied grant of discretion, and changed the standard of review to 
one that defers to the Tax Commission, unless that decision by the 
Tax Commission is "unreasonable or arbitrary". In doing so, the 
court referred to the case of BJ-Titan Services v. State Tax 
Commission, 842 P.2d 822 (Utah, 1992), where the Utah Supreme Court 
found "some discretion in determining whether a certain transaction 
2 
constitutes a sale of 'tangible |jei ^ i nim I ( i «»f^ ji 1 ', '" ll T!i« jupmme 
Court again addressed the question in the case oJ Chicago pridue k 
ILUU Cu. v. State Tax Commission, 83U P.<id 303 (Utah, 1992), I he 
court stated there: 
Whether the subject matter of a sales transaction is 
deemed real property or tangible personal property will 
depend on the facts of each case. The weighing of *:he 
various relevant factors leading to the ultimate decision 
by the Commission as to whether a taxpayer is a real 
property contractor or not is a ruling that is based part 
on law and part on fact In ruling on such issues, the 
Commission must necessarily exercise a degree of 
discretion, and we accordingly defer to the Commission's 
determination. We will not upset its ruling unless it is 
unreasonable or arbitrary,. 8 39 P 2d at 3 07, 
The important part of th:i s statement is the question of 
_; v ,, f ^4.^,, o^iina tv "che ultimate 
decision . • :;*- , .rmss; --• . *L 
property r o n r r v t o i . «.; 1 na^ qr ifitea ca r t e blanche L .lie 
n - - -v- wh-+ *-^  . ^insa^t' .rn ; ^al 
property eisc . - Uwp^rty i r , ^ . e 
• ; thor i ty ?rented to them, by the Utah .Supreme Court,, In order to 
' -i ' <•. r r 'e S t a t e Tax Commiss i o r 
^e iU ' - ^eJeVcint a i u . , ( * « - * . , * , - e 
z i x p a y e r x r e a l p r o p e r v r : , n t r ^ * ~i ^ w *e e<- A ; t 
I ax Cuirr . ^*" r * * \«. relevant 
fac*. ^rs jsi . - . - i.^ , i ^^nsi „_: , 
the taxpayer _-- ^roperty ^ j n t r ^ d o , 
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question in the minds of the Tax Commission; and it should have 
been. Whether the relevant factors were weighed and whether the 
appropriate law was applied should be decided by a "correction of 
error" standard as previously suggested by Petitioner. Only after 
finding that the State Tax Commission went through the appropriate 
procedure and considered the appropriate factors, must they be 
granted the discretion referred to by the Utah Supreme Court. 
There is no question in anyone's mind that Valgardson Housing 
Systems makes modular buildings which become part of the real 
estate as soon as they are attached. There is also no question 
that Petitioner is a licensed general contractor in the state of 
Utah. Those items have been proved, have been stipulated to, and 
are not in controversy. The fact that those items were ignored by 
the Utah State Tax Coinmission in its decision is a legal error that 
should be corrected by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE DISTINCTION MADE BY THE STATE TAX COMMISSION BETWEEN 
A TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TRANSACTION AND THAT 
INVOLVING AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL ESTATE IS NEITHER 
CORRECT NOR REASONABLE. 
In Point III of its Reply Brief, Petitioner cited the case of 
Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Sterling Custom Homes Corp.. 283 
NW.2d 573 (Wis. 1979). That case was almost identical to the 
present one. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the modular 
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construction company was a contractor, was involved in real estate 
construction activities, and was entitled to have its activities 
taxed as improvements to real property. The decision by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court goes to the very heart of the matter at 
issue here. Because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the same 
contentions made by the Utah State Tax Commission and refuted them 
in their entirety, Petitioner asks this Court to review that 
decision once more. At the risk of being redundant, Petitioner 
therefore sets forth once again the reasoning of that court. 
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Court stated: 
In reaching our conclusion that Sterling Homes was a 
contractor and a consumer of the goods, we look to the 
general scope of its activities in its home-construction 
enterprise. 283 N.W.2d at 574. 
The facts of the Wisconsin case were almost identical to the 
present facts: 
When the foundation was completed and the builder was 
ready to erect the house, the taxpayer loaded the 
components in the sequence that conformed to the order 
that the components would be used at the job site. The 
components were delivered to the job site by the tax 
payer's trucks and drivers. At the job site, the larger 
components were unloaded by crane. The crane operators 
were hired by the builder, but were usually selected by 
one of the taxpayers salesmen. . . . Although the 
drivers7 only defined on-site responsibility was to keep 
a report with respect to the erection, they often helped 
or supervised, because they were very familiar with the 
process. 283 N.W.2d at 574-5. 
The court went on to say: 
The taxability of the transaction transferring the 
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components to the builder is dependent on whether 
Sterling Homes was engaged in "real property construction 
activities." If Sterling Homes was engaged in such an 
activity, than it is a contractor or a subcontractor and 
is a consumer of the tangible personal property used in 
real property construction activities and the sales tax 
applies to transfers to Sterling Homes and not by it. 
The facts demonstrate that, in all respects but one, the 
taxpayer was engaged in real property construction 
activities. The lone exception is that Sterling Homes 
conducted its construction activities at a factory, 
rather than at the building site. The taxpayer used the 
materials it purchased for only a single purpose — to 
construct custom-designed homes to be assembled at 
predetermined locations on foundations which were 
specifically designed for the prefabricated components. 
The components thus assembled were consumed by the very 
process of fabrication, for which they would be useless 
in their fabricated form except for the very building for 
which designed. 
The distinction between on-site and off-site construction 
of the components is not a criterion upon which the 
legislature has hinged the question of taxability. 
Rather, taxability is to be determined by whether or not 
the taxpayer is engaged in 'real property construction 
activities.' The record leaves no doubt that Sterling 
Homes was so engaged. 283 N.W.2d at 575. 
It is Petitioner's contention that the Utah Supreme Court has 
adopted the basic reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the 
Chicago Bridge case, referred to in Point I. In that case, the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth the kind of analysis to be used to 
determine questions such as the present one. The Supreme Court 
stated: 
In effect, a real property contractor is treated as a 
consumer for sales tax purposes. 
The reason for this rule is that materials which are 
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purchased and 1::!: lei i converted IWLC *.;c . property would 
escape the sales tax because a sales t>.:- i:- not imposed 
on the sale of real property, Real property contractors 
are therefore considered the consumers because their 
purchases of materials that are incorporated into real 
property are the last transactions in which those 
materia], s can, be subjected to the sales tax 
The test for determining wheuiei i , t i x ,
 Aw * . -.*. 
property contractor is based not only on who :cnve:ts 
tangible personal property intc -i property, but *.so 
on the nature of the transactic "- "> 2d at 
A similar line of reasoning was idoptea ear.^e- *-*.<* ca?p of 
BJ-ii Ldn Services _y...... SLate . I'ax Commiss L <JT U<± 
1992 i . in the BJ-Titan Services cast 1 
cement to be poured into * well- .- o.;: * au^iyzeo vijet; . . '; 
the < em^n1 ht->c iine p*'* "* I hf real property, and thus became part 
of a real property transaction TIIL JCIII I, t JUIHJ that i1 li I u < , 
It was admit.ted by al I parties that the well operator was primarily 
responsible I i pull iinj I lie lament actually into the w- ';at 
was not an ist..ue Hie onJ / issue was whH'.hwi m I t 
became part nf the realty, and part ot i real estate transaction. 
Tha t :i s in i .HUM IIIH M I im I .M hi I HI that issue has Deem ignored. 
The Chicago Bridge case also quoteu uic cist m Nicker sun rump & 
.Machinery Co. v. State Tax Commission, 361 P.2d h2o (Utah, i >61) 
whii'li fieiii ffiii t i ,=*hr H vit-1 u m d installer of large pumptf- wa; nut 
a real property contractor, rtio Chicago Bridge I'OUM m i M M n m in 
its earlier decision, stated: 
The nurt hasprl Mill " n*"l usion on several factors: (1) 
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The pumps were removable without harm to the structures 
on which they were placed; (2) they were manufactured 
with the idea that they could be used at different 
locations; (3) the parties contemplated that the pumps 
would be removed for repairs or replacement; (4) the 
primary purpose of the sales agreements was the sale and 
purchase of the pumps assembled according to 
specifications and the installation of the pumps was 
merely incidental to that purpose; (5) the installation 
was for the convenience of the purchaser because of the 
great weight of the pumps; and (6) the sales agreements 
did not indicate that the pumps were intended to be 
treated as real property upon installation. 839 P.2d at 
307. 
The Supreme Court, in the Chicago Bridge case, found that 
Petitioner was a real property contractor, even when the materials 
were not installed in the state of Utah. In doing so, it relied on 
the fact that the tanks manufactured by Chicago Bridge, and which 
were installed by agents of Chicago Bridge in another state were 
"not readily removable" and they were not intended to be removed. 
839 P.2d at 307. 
The theory of taxing real property contractors was laid out in 
the BJ-Titan Services case where the court stated that contractors: 
. . . purchased the materials not to resell them in their 
original form, but for the purpose of changing their 
nature from personal to real property. For this reason, 
the exemption for ingredients or component parts of 
tangible personal property does not apply to contractors. 
842 P.2d at 827. 
Clearly Petitioner herein is engaged in changing the nature 
from personal to real property. When the home is put on a crane 
and removed from the truck, that conversion process is almost 
8 
i. u i i i p l e i e . . • . . ' . 
The Supreme Court has clearly set forth the law to be usetf A~ 
determining whether what Plaintiff does as an integral |.MII 
real estate transaction atuJ wlieLhei Pet ill innei i "• i i ea.l propyl ty 
contractor 'The Utah State Tax Commission never made such .in 
analysis, and never applied the law, The Tax Commission used its 
method nil, niidlysis, wlii , h IJIIiii > inn I rhai act ei* i v\ M I i in 
"'affixation' distinction" I Vhile this Court's rul i ng that such a 
distinction i s not "unreasonable" might otherwi se be correct, :i t 
simply does not conform to the Supreme Court's directives. Such a 
decision by the Utah State Tax Commission could onJ y be upheld if 
Utah Supreme Court and stll 1 rejected Petitioner #s arguments. The 
fact that they have not been willi nq to do so makes their decision 
unreasonable, per se 
GIVEN THE COURT'S RULING ON OTHER MATTERS, THE COURT'S 
FINDING THAT IT IS PETITIONER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO COLLECT 
AND PAY THE SALES TAX IS IN ERROR. 
Based upon line e-H li»-»i pail . ol i I. i 11 I i 1111 ml n h Tel it j n niei 
does not here concede are correct, tiiia court is eon reef in 
determining that It is the dealer who has "primary liability tor 
t lie iJales 1.1tx in in | 11 11 i I ' l l i i n u t I i i i i M i i n i l i M I ( , 
however, in determining that Petitioner thus becomes a "retailer" 
for any purpose whatsoever. The parties have stipulated that a 
special rule exists in the case of contractors. That special rule 
allows the real property contractor to purchase building materials 
in a tax exempt transaction, and then to determine and pay the tax 
only upon the sale of that home to the ultimate buyer. That 
special rule is set out in the additional stipulated facts 
submitted with Petitioner's original brief, and also submitted 
herewith. Assuming (but not admitting) that the court is correct 
that Valgardson Housing Systems is merely selling building supplies 
to a contractor (the dealer) then the court is taxing the wrong 
transaction. The purchase of building supplies is tax exempt, and 
it is up to the dealer to determine and pay the tax. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners petition for a rehearing should be granted, the 
Court should re-examine the legal issues as set forth above, and 
the original decision herein should be vacated. 
CERTIFICATION 
Counsel for Petitioner hereby certifies, pursuant to Rule 35 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Petition for 
Rehearing is made in good faith, and is not made for the purposes 
of delay. Petitioner has previously paid all disputed taxes, and 
no collection action is pending. 
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DATED this day of __. 1993, 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
/ ^&sfil. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of fA{^^cA^J 1993, 
I did mail two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
Reply Brief, postage prepaid to Clark Snelson, Attorney for 
Respondent, 36 South State Street, 11th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, 
cJ^XsM 
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W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170) 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VALGARDSON HOUSING SYSTEMS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
ADDITIONAL STIPULATED 
FACTS 
Appeal No. 91-1323 
Respondent. 
oooOooo 
COME NOW the parties to the above-entitled action and, in 
addition to the Stipulated Facts previously entered herein, agree 
and stipulate to the following facts: 
1. Petitioner purchases building materials in a tax exempt 
transaction. 
2. Petitioner pays sales tax on the sales of his homes, 
based on total sales made during the period of each return, 
including cash, credit, installment and conditional sales made 
during that period. Sales tax is paid on 50% of the purchase price 
of the home, and including transportation costs (see previous 
Stipulted Facts Nos. 23, 24 and 25). 
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